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Congressional Power Under the Appointments Clause. After 
Buckley v. Valeo 
The appointments clause of the United States Constitution1 
designates the manner by which certain government officers shall be 
nominated and appointed. The substantive content of this provision 
received little attention2 until the adoption of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,3 which created the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) and prescribed the methods for the ap-
pointment of its members. 4 Specifically, the statute provided that 
four of the six voting members of the FEC must be approved by 
designated congressional officers and that all six must be approved 
by Congress.5 In Buckley v. Valeo,6 which offered the first detailed 
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The clause is reprinted in text at note 15 infra. 
2. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the clause in the past forty years has 
focused primarily on the implied authority to remove a person from federal office. 
See note 52 infra. 
3. 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). 
4. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975). Other provisions of the Act limited 
contributions to and expenditures for a candidate's campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 608(b), 
(e) (Supp. V 1975), placed a ceiling on expenditures, 18 U.S.C. § 608(a), (c) 
(Supp. V 1975), imposed reporting and disclosure requirements for those contributing 
in excess of certain amounts, 2 U.S.C. § 431-437(a) (Supp. V 1975), and provided 
for public financing of presidential campaigns, 26 U.S.C. § 9001-9042 (Supp. V 
1915). See Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign 
Reform, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 852, 852-53 (1976). 
5. The provision was as follows: 
There is established a commission to be known as the Federal Election Commis-
sion. The Commission is composed of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk 
of the House, ex officio and without the right to vote, and 6 members appointed 
as follows: 
(A) 2 shall be appointed, with the confirmation of both Houses of the Con-
gress, by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendations of 
the majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the Senate; 
(B) 2 shall be appointed, with the confirmation of both Houses of the Con-
gress, by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon the recommenda-
tions of the majority leader of the House and the minority leader of the House; 
(C) 2 shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority of both Houses 
of Congress, by the President of the United States. 
2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975). 
This procedure was designed to retain in Congress a certain degree of control over 
the FEC. See 120 CoNG. REc. 24,472-73 (1974). The appointment of members of 
the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries is quite similar, 2 
U.S.C. § 352(a) (1970), and may raise the kinds of problems discussed in this Note. 
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley was instituted in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
as amended in 1974. This statute permits an action, including a declaratory judg-
ment, appropriate to construe the constitutionality of its provisions. The action may 
be brought by the Federal Election Commission, the national committee of any politi-
cal party, or any individual eligible to vote in a presidential election. 2 U.S.C. 437h 
(Supp. V 1975). As required by the Act, the district court certified the constitutional 
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analysis of the content of the appointments clause, 7 the Supreme 
Court found the statute's appointment procedure unconstitutional8 in 
a decision that severely limited congressional control over the 
appointment of government officers. 
This Note examines the constitutional power of Congress to con-
trol the selection of government officers. It first discusses the article 
II grant itself and concludes that the Court in Buckley correctly inter-
preted that provision to prohibit direct appointment by Congress of 
officers who are found to possess "significant authority." The Note 
then explores possible means not explicitly foreclosed in Buckley by 
which Congress might influence such appointments and argues that 
these alternatives are restricted by the same constitutional principles 
that prohibit direct congressional appointments. 
questions to the appropriate circuit court of appeals, which in this instance was the 
District of Columbia Circuit. The plaintiffs challenged diverse provisions of the Act, 
including the constitutionality of the appointment method used in selecting the mem-
bers of the newly founded Federal Election Commission. On that issue, the court 
of appeals, sitting en bane, held that Congress could vest certain "legislative" powers 
in the Commission as appointed, and that as to the remaining powers, some of which 
raised serious constitutional questions, the issue of constitutionality was not yet ripe 
for review. 519 F.2d 817, 893 (D.C.' Cir. 1975). The dissenters argued that the 
method of appointment violated the separation of powers doctrine embodied in article 
II. 519 F.2d at 920-21 (Tamm, J., dissenting) and 923-34 (MacKinnon, J., dissent• 
ing). The Supreme Court held that the method of appointment violated article II, 
with seven justices joining the per curiam decision and Justice White filing a separate 
concurrence. 
7. The Court's only previous encounter with a congressional attempt to exercise 
the appointment power came in United States v. Cooper, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 104 
(1891), affd. sub nom. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893). That case 
involved two people already holding offices in the military who were named to a new 
commission to select land for condemnation in Washington, D.C. The Supreme 
Court avoided a comprehensive discussion of article II by holding that, although the 
state required that specific officers be appointed to the commission, this kind of in-
crease in powers and duties of an existing office was not an appointment so long as 
the new powers and duties could not "fairly be said to have been dissimilar to, or 
outside of the sphere of, [the officers' present] official duties." 147 U.S. at 301. The 
Court also raised sua sponte the problem of congressional appointments in United 
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 51 ( 1851 ), but failed to decide the issue. See also 
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) (holding that the legislature of 
the Philippine Islands could not make appointments to executive agencies). 
Buckley has generated new interest in the nature of the appointment power. 
For example, a leading casebook has added a new section on the appointment power 
in its most recent supplement. See w. LocKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CON• 
STITUTIONAL LAw 20-23 (4th ed. Supp. 1976). Most recent discussions of the Buckley 
decision, however, have focused on other aspects of the case and have ignored the 
appointment power holding. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 854 n.24; Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Individual Political Campaign Con-
tributions and Expenditures: The Supreme Courfs Decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 25 
EMORY L.J. 400 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 171-
86 (1976). 
8. The other provisions of the Act were challenged on first amendment and equal 
protection grounds. The Court struck down limits on individual expenditures, limits 
on total spending by a candidate, and limits on a candidate's expenditures from his 
own funds. It upheld ceilings on contributions to the campaigns of others, the public 
financing of presidential campaigns, and the provisions for disclosure.' See The Su-
preme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 7, at 172. 
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I. THE CONTENT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
The constitutional principle underlying the federal appointment 
process is separation of powers, 9 which embraces the idea that while 
a strict division of authority between the three branches of govern-
ment is not required, 10 a concentration of power in any single branch 
is unacceptable.11 Thus, any encroachment by one branch upon the 
domain of another must be avoided.12 This principle is manifested 
in the ineligibility and incompatibility clauses of article I, which ex-
plicitly proscribe members of Congress from holding other govern-
mental offices.13 Such a prohibition prevents Congress from creat-
ing offices for self-serving purposes and from participating directly 
in the executive branch's law enforcement functions.14 As construed 
9. As the Court in Buckley noted at the outset of its discussion of the appoint-
ments clause: 
The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization 
in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted 
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. • . • 
It is in the context of these cognate provisions of the document [providing 
for separation of powers] that we must examine the language of Art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2 •.•• 
424 U.S. at 124. 
10. In Buckley the Court noted that "it is also clear from the provisions of the 
Constitution itself, and from the Federalist Papers, that the Constitution by no means 
contemplates total separation of each of [the] three essential branches of Govern-
ment." 424 U.S. at 121. The Court pointed to the appointment power itself as an 
example of the commingling of authority in the Senate and the President. 424 U.S. 
at 121. But cf. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (holding 
that these very textual exceptions "emphasize the generally inviolate character of the 
[separation of powers] plan"). 
11. According to James Madison: 
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim [concerning the basis for 
separation of powers doctrine] are a further demonstration of his meaning. 
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or 
body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest 
the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in 
a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legis-
lative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, 
for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive 
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor." (emphasis 
original). 
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (G. Putnam's Sons ed. 1908) (cited in Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 120-21). 
12. "The framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the 
tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment 
or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." 424 U.S. at 122. The 
Court cites historical sources for its position. See 424 U.S. at 129 n.166. 
13. The Constitution provides as follows: 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, 
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which 
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased 
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, 
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. 
14. See J. PELTASON, CoRWIN AND PELTASON's UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITU-
TION 46-47 (5th ed. 1970); 2 nm RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 283-88 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as M. Farrand]. 
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by the Court in Buckley, the appointments clause complements the 
ineligibility and incompatibility clauses by precluding Congress from 
appointing those who will hold executive office thereby depriving 
Congress of even indirect control over executive policymaking. 
These separation of powers considerations are evident when the 
content of the appointments clause is analyzed: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by •and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such Inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.11; 
The language of the clause raises three primary issues, all of which 
were addressed by the Court in Buckley: the meaning of the phrase 
"Officers of the United States";10 the effect of the "otherwise pro-
vided for" textual exception, which is a direct limitation upon the 
appointment power itself;17 and the scope of the "excepting clause," 
which permits an alternative method of appointment for inferior 
officers.18 
By its terms, the appointments clause applies only to certain 
specifically enumerated officials and to "Officers of the United 
States."19 Thus, the first question in any appointments clause 
inquiry is whether the official in question, if not listed, is such an 
"officer." In Buckley, the Court, relying on an old series of cases 
that established general guidelines for the term, held that a commis-
sioner of the FEC is an officer of the United States. 20 The Court 
initially cited United States v. Germaine21 as indicating "that the term 
15. U.S . .CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
16. See notes 19-35 infra and accompanying text. 
17. See notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See notes 42-51 infra and accompanying text. 
19. Throughout this Note, the term "Officers of the United States" includes "In• 
ferior Officers" as specified in art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
20. 424 U.S. at 126. 
21. 99 U.S. 508 (1879). In Germaine a civil surgeon appointed by the Commis-
sioner of Pensions had been indicted under a federal extortion statute that addressed 
itself to "every officer of the United States who is guilty of extortion under the color 
of his office." 99 U.S. at 509. The Court initially noted: 
The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all its 
officers into two classes. The primary class requires a nomination by the Pres-
ident and confirmation by the Senate. But foreseeing that when offices became 
numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it 
was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, 
Congress might by Jaw vest their appointment in the President alone, in the 
courts of Jaw, or in the heads of departments. That all persons who can be said 
to hold an office under the government about to be established under the Con-
stitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes 
of appointment there can be but little doubt. 
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'Officers of the United States' . . . is . . . intended to have substan-
tive meaning."22 It then went on to hold, without further citation 
of authority, that "[the term's] fair import is that any appointee exer-
cising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States 
is an Officer of the United States, and must, therefore, be appointed 
in the manner prescribed by section 2, cl. 2, of [article m."23 
Unfortunately, the Court did not further elaborate on the mean-
ing of the "significant authority" standard. It instead intuitively com-
pared the office of FEC commissioner with lower-level positions 
99 U.S. at 509-10. In testing Germaine's civil surgeon position against the terms of 
the statute requiring that he be an "officer of the United States," the Court held: 
It is, therefore, not to be supposed that Congress, when enacting a criminal law 
for the punishment of officers of the United States, intended to punish any one 
not appointed in one of those modes. If the punishment were designed for 
others than officers as defined by the Constitution, words to that effect would 
be used, as servant, agent, person in the service or employment of the govern-
ment; and this has been done where it was so intended. 
99 U.S. at 510. Because Germaine had not been appointed pursuant to either of the 
article II methods he was held not to be an officer of the United States and thus not 
subject to the terms of the statute. 
22. 424 U.S. at 125-26. The Court carefully used the earlier case as an indica-
tion that the phrase "Officers of the United States" was not to be read as "merely 
dealing with etiquette or protocol . . . but [that] the drafters had a less frivolous 
purpose in mind." 424 U.S. at 125. It thereby avoided the problems inherent in 
extending the Germaine reasoning beyond its narrow criminal setting to the broader 
constitutional situation in Buckley. The Germaine Court had accepted as given the 
constitutionality of the manner in which Germaine had been appointed, and merely 
applied the procedure mandated by article II to determine if he was an officer of 
the United States. See note 21 supra. This approach sheds no light on the question 
of how to determine who should be appointed according to article II. By a simple 
extension of the Germaine reasoning, the Court could have held that the FEC Com-
missioners were not officers of the United States because they were not appointed 
in conformity with the appointments clause, and that the method by which they were 
appointed was constitutional because it need not comport with the article II provis-
ions. The circularity of the argument in the context of the FEC is clear. The prob-
lem is that the Germaine Court did not attempt to determine the content of the 
phrase "Officers of the United States." It failed to explore the possibility that 
Germaine was, in fact, an officer of the United States, subject to the reach of the 
statute, who had been unconstitutionally appointed. The Buckley Court noted that 
the initial inquiry in the FEC situation must be to determine whether the appointee 
in question is an officer of the United States on the basis of a more substantive dis-
cussion of his duties and powers. Only after this question is resolved does it make 
sense to decide on the role of article II procedures. 
It should be noted that the Court has, on occasion, addressed this more substan-
tive question. In United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1·867), the 
Court defined the term "office" as one that "embraces the ideas of tenure, duration 
of emolument, and duties." This test, however, was established in a case requiring 
the definition of public office rather than officer of the United States. As a conse-
quence the Court's definition is insufficient to distinguish a secretary from a cabinet 
officer. The Court has, however, apparently used the Hartwell definition in other 
holdings involving statutory construction. See Auffmordt v. I:Iedden, 137 U.S. 327 
(1890) (case involving appointment of merchant appraiser); United States v. Per-
kins, 116 U.S. 483, 484 (1886) (a cadet-engineer was an officer of the United States 
for pay purposes and his appointment was constitutionally vested in the Secretary of 
the Navy, a department head). 
23. 424 U.S. at 126 (emphasis added). 
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found to be "inferior offices" in earlier cases, 24 holding that the 
commissioners were "at the very least such 'inferior officers,' "26 and 
that, therefore, the method of their appointment must comply with 
article II.26 This intuitive comparison worked well in Buckley where 
the authority vested in the position to be evaluated was relatively 
great. However, it offers little guidance for more difficult cases, in 
particular, those situations where the Court must distinguish officers 
at the lower level of authority. 27 
Justice White's concurring opinion was more helpful in delineat-
ing a boundary between those who wield "significant authority" and 
those who do not. He found the major criteria for inclusion within 
the article II category of "officers" to be the "breadth of [the offi-
cials'] assigned duties and the nature and importance of their as-
signed functions."28 After a brief discussion of the FEC's assigned 
duties and functions,29 Justice White concluded: 
[l]t is plain that the FEC is the primary agency for the enforcement 
and administration of major parts of the election laws. . . . [W]ithin 
the wide zone of its authority the FEC is independent of executive 
as well as congressional control except insofar as certain of its regu-
lations must be laid before and not be disapproved by Congress. . . . 
With duties and functions such as these, members of the FEC are 
plainly officers of the United States as that term is used in Art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2.30 
24. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (postmaster first class); Ex parte 
Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (judicial clerk). It should be noted that both 
of these cases involved the removal power rather than the appointment power. 
25. 424 U.S. at 126. 
26. 424 U.S. at 126. The Court has thus retained that part of Germaine that 
required all officers of the United States to be appointed in compliance with article 
II. See note 21 supra. This Germaine interpretation of article II may reasonably 
be invoked once an initial determination that an office meets the substantial authority 
test has been made. See note 22 supra. 
27. See 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. The Court in Buckley implied that distinguishing 
federal employees from officers of the United States was a simple matter, noting that 
"[e]mployees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States." 
424 U.S. at 126 n.162 (citations omitted). However, if that standard were applied 
to either the postmaster first class in Myers or the judicial clerk in He1111en, both 
workers would appear to be employees-a result in direct conflict with the holdings 
of these cases. 
It is worth noting that this employee-officer distinction has also served to dis-
tinguish other nonofficer groups such as agents and contractors. See United States 
v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879). Given the enormous growth of the federal 
administrative system and its complicated interrelationships, the Court's test seems in• 
adequate. It is unfortunate that the Court did not clarify this issue in Buckley. 
28. 424 U.S. at 269-70. 
29. Justice White referred to the FEC's involvement in three aspects of the 
election laws: (1) the limitations on political contributions and expenditures; (2) 
the reporting and disclosure requirements for political contributions and expenditures; 
and (3) the public financing of presidential primary and general election campaigns. 
424 U.S. at 270. 
30. 424 U.S. at 270. 
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Although this reasoning is somewhat tautological, it does provide a 
more principled basis for future decisions than the intuitive compari-
sons suggested by the majority.31 It is, at least, meaningful to apply 
the "primary agency" and "independence" criteria described by J us-
tice White to measure significant authority. On the other hand, it 
is impossible to order systematically, as the comparison technique re-
quires, the significance of the authority exercised by, illustratively, 
a custom collector's clerk,32 a United States assistant treasurer's 
clerk, 33 a navy paymaster's clerk, 34 and a judicial clerk. 35 Regard-
less of where and how the lower line is drawn, at the very least those 
individuals who exercise sufficiently significant authority to pose a 
separation of powers problem are to be deemed, under Buckley, 
"officers" of the United States who must be appointed in accordance 
with the requirements of article II. 
Once it is decided that a government official is such an officer, 
it then must be determined whether one of the appointments clause's 
two textual exceptions applies to the officer in question. The first ex-
ception provides that any officer whose selection is governed by a con-
stitutional provision other than the appointments clause will not be 
subject to the article II procedures.36 The Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia accepted the argument that the "other-
wise provided for" exception could be invoked in Buckley by con-
struing the FEC as a "legislative agency"-that is, an agency de-
signed primarily to "carry out appropriate legislative functions."37 
The court appeared to find the authority for the appointment by Con-
gress of officers of such agencies in the necessary and proper clause. 38 
31. The significant authority test is similar to the "reasonable man" standard in 
tort and the "fair play and substantial justice" standard in jurisdictional inquiries. 
All require elaboration, which Justice White's concurrence attempts to supply in this 
case. 
32. United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525 (1888) (held not to be an officer of 
the United States). 
33. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867) (held to be an 
officer of the United States). 
34. United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303 (1888) (held not to be an officer of 
the United States). 
35. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (held to be an officer of 
the United States). The holdings of these cases dealing with the importance of par-
ticular positions simply cannot be reconciled in a meaningful or consistent way on 
the basis of the authority vested in them. 
36. See text at note 15 supra. 
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1975). It was on the basis 
of a "legislative agency" theory that the court of appeals held constitutional those 
powers of the FEC that were ripe for adjudication. The term "legislative agency" 
appears to have been coined by the court of appeals in deciding Buckley, since there 
is no statutory definition or prior case law use of the term. See Note, Federal Elec-
tion Reform: An Examination of the Constitutionality of the Federal Election Com-
mission, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 451, 452-53 (1976). 
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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However, this position was rejected by the Supreme Court,:10 which, 
in holding that "there is no provision of the Constitution remotely 
providing any alternative means for the selection of the members of 
the Commission or for anybody like them,"40 removed the FEC from 
the scope of the "otherwise provided for'' language of the appoint-
ments clause. By strictly construing this language, the Court closed 
a potentially enormous loophole that would have permitted Congress 
to circumvent the requirements of article II-including its carefully 
crafted checks and balances-through the use of the necessary and 
proper clause.41 
The second textual exception, which is referred to as the 
"excepting clause," provides an alternative appointment method for 
"Inferior Officers."42 Although the appointments clause stipulates 
that certain listed officers, such as judges and ambassadors, must be 
nominated by the President and approved by the Senate, inferior of-
ficers may instead, if Congress so chooses, be appointed by the Presi-
dent alone, the courts, or the heads of departments. The scope of 
this alternative, however, is uncertain. The Supreme Court has 
39. 424 U.S. at 134-35. 
40. 424 U.S. at 127. The Court noted that this holding did not impair "the 'in-
herent power of Congress' to appoint its own officers," 424 U.S. at 127, because an 
alternative rationale could be found in art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (stating that "[t]he House 
of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; ... ") and in art. 
I, § 3, cl. 5 (stating that "[t]he Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a 
President pro tempore ... "). 424 U.S. at 127. 
The claim that Congress could directly appoint FEC Commissioners was based 
on both the plenary authority of Congress to regulate elections (U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 4, discussed in 424 U.S. at 131), and, as mentioned above, its necessary and 
proper clause power to create offices (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, discussed i11 
424 U.S. at 134-35). The Court noted, however, that "Congress has plenary authority 
in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction . . . so long as the ex-
ercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction." 424 
U.S. at 132 (citation omitted). Therefore, according to the Court, any congressional 
authority of appointment based on these legislative powers would be circumscribed 
by the terms of the appointments clause. In the Court's view, article II requires that 
"[u]nless their selection is elsewhere provided for, all officers of the United States 
are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause." 424 U.S. at 132 (emphasis 
original). Since congressional power to regulate elections or to create offices does 
not grant authority to exceed this express limitation of article II, Congress cannot 
"vest in itself, or in its officers, the authority to appoint officers of the United States 
when the appointments clause by clear implication prohibits it from doing so." 424 
U.S. at 135. 
41. It is interesting to note, however, that the ultimate holding of Buckley is not 
that the FEC is unconstitutionally appointed but rather that, as appointed, it cannot 
exercise the powers assigned to it. See 424 U.S. at 143. This holding actually ap-
pears to support the legislative agency concept. Instead of holding the method by 
which the Commissioners were appointed unconstitutional, the Court found that cer-
tain powers were not "sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement 
of'public law to allow [them] to be performed by the present Commission." 424 U.S. 
at 141. Such an approach is not consistent with a decision based on article II. If 
the appointments clause is indeed the reason that the FEC is unconstitutional, it is 
the appointment method, not the power grants, that offends article II. 
42. The clause is reprinted in text at note 12 supra. 
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never attempted to distinguish an "officer" from an "inferior offi-
cer. "43 Consequently the question of which officers are subject to 
the excepting clause remains open. 
In addition, the range of choices available to Congress requires 
comment. In Buckley, where the method by which the FEC was 
appointed clearly did not satisfy the article II procedures for 
"superior" officers, the question facing the Court was whether the 
excepting clause could "somehow be read to include Congress or its 
officers as among those in whom the appointment power may be 
vested. "44 
The two arguments advanced to support such a reading of the 
excepting clause were rejected by the Court. First, it dismissed on 
textual grounds the claim that the term "Heads of Departments" 
should be construed to include Congress or its officers: 
The phrase "Heads of Departments," used as it is in conjunction with 
the phrase "Courts of Law," suggests that the Departments referred 
to are themselves in the Executive Branch or at least have some con-
nection with that branch. While the Clause expressly authorizes 
Congress to vest the appointment of certain officers in the "Courts 
of Law," the absence of similar language to include Congress must 
mean that neither Congress nor its officers were included within the 
language "Heads of Departments" in this part of cl. 2. 45 
Although the framers left virtually no indication of what they meant 
by the term, 46 the Supreme Court's patently reasonable literal con-
struction is supported by substantial judicial precedent. 47 
More importantly, this construction is supported by the separa-
tion of powers considerations that underlie the appointments clause-
considerations that were evident in the Court's response to the 
government's second, more general, argument that "because the 
Framers had no intention of relegating Congress to a position below 
that of the co-equal Judicial and Executive Branches of the National 
Government, the Appointments Clause must somehow be read to in-
43. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 135 
( 1957). The line between inferior officers and employees is also unclear. See note 
21 supra. The Court chose to proceed without determining if the FEC Commission-
ers were inferior officers. Because it found that the congressional officers in whom 
the FEC appointments had been vested were not included in the excepting clause and, 
therefore, that the appointment method could not be utilized in any event, if it had no 
reason to reach the question. 424 U.S. at 131-32. See notes 44-51 infra and accom-
panying text. 
44. 424 U.S. at 128-29. 
45. 424 U.S. at 127. 
46. The excepting clause was added on September 25, 1787, a mere two days be-
fore adjournment. Having failed to pass the first time on a closely divided vote, it 
was approved because it was "too necessary" to be excluded. See M. Farrand, 
supra note 14, at 627-28. It is impossible to tell from the sketchy discussion relating 
almost exclusively to the need for the provision as a whole what the scope of the 
clause was intended to be. 
41. Germaine supports this reading of the phrase. See 99 U.S. at 510-11. 
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elude the Congress or its officers as among those in whom the appoint-
ment power must be vested."48 In responding to this claim, the 
Court relied heavily upon the records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion. It compared interim drafts of the Constitution, which vested 
part of the appointment power in the Senate alone, with the final 
draft of article II, which contains no provision for congressional con-
trol of appointments.49 The Court believed this to be "a deliberate 
change made by the Framers with the intent to deny Congress any 
authority itself to appoint those who were 'Officers of the United 
States.' "50 This change, according to the Court, was motivated by 
separation of powers considerations-specifically, the "fear that 
[Congress] will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two 
branches."51 In short, it appears that the list of alternative locations 
for vesting of the appointments power will be read literally and ex-
clusively by the Court. 
The Court's discussion of these three issues-the meaning of the 
phrase "Officers of the United States," the effect of the "otherwise 
provided for" textual exception, and the scope of the excepting 
clause--demonstrates that the appointments clause is an integral part 
of a broader constitutional scheme that implements basic principles 
thought by the Framers to be essential to just government. As Jus-
tice White explained in his concurrence: 
The language of the Appointments Clause is not mere inadvertence. 
. . . The appointment power was a major building block fitted 
into the constitutional structure designed to avoid the accumulation 
or exercise of arbitrary power by the Federal Government. . . . The 
48. 424 U.S. at 128-29. 
49. 424 U.S. at 129-31. The original draft submitted by the Committee of De-
tail in its August 6, 1787 report contained the following two appointment provisions: 
Article IX, Section 1. The Senate of the United States shall have the power 
. . . to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the supreme court. 
Article X, Section 2. [The President] shall commission all the officers of the 
United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for 
by this Constitution. 
M. Farrand, supra note 14, at 183, 185. The version adopted as art. II, § 2, cl, 2 
makes no provision for independent senatorial appointments, but instead requires the 
Senate's advice and consent. See text at note 15 supra. 
50. 424 U.S. at 129. The Court appeared to read this change, coupled with a re-
laxation of the art. I, § 6 limitations on congressional eligibility for office, as evi-
dence of a compromise. See 424 U.S. at 131. However, the Court viewed the 
meaning of "officers" as remaining the same in both versions, and as encompassing 
"all appointed officials exercising responsibility under the public laws of the Nation." 
424 U.S. at 131. Yet the records of the Convention offer little support for this 
theory. The Framers, unable to reach an agreement on the appointment provisions 
suggested by the Committee of Detail, see note 49 supra, referred the problem to the 
Committee of Eleven for further discussion. See M. Farrand, supra note 14, at 493, 
495. The Committee's report was not acted on until September 7, 1787, when it 
was passed in the closing days of the Convention with virtually no discussion. Id. 
at 538-40. It is very difficult to draw any accurate inferences from the sketchy his-
tory, particularly as to any consensus of the Framers. 
51. 424 U.S. at 129, 
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separation-of-powers principle was implemented by a series of provi-
sions, among which was the knowing decision that Congress was to 
have no power whatsoever to appoint federal officers . . . . 
. . . A fundamental tenet was that the same persons should not 
both legislate and administer the laws. 52 
II. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Buckley placed strict limitations upon the ability of Congress 
to control directly the appointment of government officers. Yet 
its decision did not foreclose all of the possible means by which 
Congress might attempt to exert influence. This section, therefore, 
will analyze alternative authorizations for congressional involvement 
derived from the appointments clause of article II and the necessary 
and proper clause of article I. 
It is appropriate to return briefly to the language of the appoint-
ments clause to make two additional inquiries about Congress' ability 
to influence the appointment process. First, the appointments 
clause explicitly assigns the Senate special duties; it provides that, 
absent congressional invocation of the alternative appointment 
methods for inferior officers found in the excepting clause, all fed-
eral appointments not provided for elsewhere in the Constitution are 
to be made by the President "by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate."53 Commentators54 and case law55 interpret this 
52. 424 U.S. at 271-72 (footnote omitted). The consistency of the entire pro-
cess of appointing and removing members of regulatory agencies is evidenced by the 
Court's treatment of the "removal power" cases, which have held that Congress can 
limit the power of the President to remove the officers of certain regulatory agencies. 
See Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Exr. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). These cases, while recognizing the executive's constitu-
tional authority to appoint such officers, stressed the independent character of these 
agencies and emphasized the need for the agencies to be free from the influence of 
the executive. See 424 U.S. at 136. Similarly, Buckley can be viewed as imposing 
complementary controls on congressional influence of independent agencies. The 
basic constitutional scheme envisions the formulation of policy by Congress through 
enabling legislation, with the executive supplementing these policy choices by select-
ing those who will administer the law. Any other result in Buckley would have 
allowed Congress both to direct policy when establishing the independent agency and 
to control law enforcement by influencing the appointment of administrators. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
54. Most constitutional historians agree that the role of the Senate is to check 
the President's discretion. See, e.g., C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 514 
(1969); E. CORWIN, supra note 43, at 78; C. THACH, THE CREATION OF nrn PRESI-
DENCY 1775-1789, at 153, 159 (1922); Salmon, History of the Appointing Power of 
the President, 1 AM. HIST. A. PAPERS 1885-1886, at 22 (1886). See M. Farrand, 
supra note 14, at 533-39; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 66, 76. 
55. The Supreme Court has held the the act of appointment is "the sole act of 
the President," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 157 (1803), but that 
"the power of appointment by the Executive is restricted in its exercise by the provi-
sion that the Senate, a part of the legislative branch of the Government, may check 
the action of the Executive by rejecting the officers he selects." Myers v. United 
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phrase to mean that the Senate possesses a "veto" power rather than 
the general authority to assist the president in the selection of 
nominees. 
It is important, however, not to underestimate the potential sig-
nificance of the Senate's advice and consent power. Theoretically, 
the Senate could veto all presidential appointments until the particu-
lar individual it most favored was nominated. As a practical matter, 
however, the veto is currently not as significant as it might be, for 
tradition and the well-entrenched reciprocal arrangement referred to 
as "senatorial courtesy"56 suggest that it will only be used in extreme 
cases.57 
The possibility still remains that the language providing for a 
senatorial "veto" might be construed as establishing only a minimum 
confirmation requirement that can be augmented by requiring some 
other body-such as the House of Representatives-also to approve 
the appointment. Buckley, however, implicitly rejected the use of 
such an augmented confirmation procedure. When discussing the 
method of selecting the FEC commissioners, 58 the Court observed 
that, "although two members of the Commission are initially selected 
by the President, his nominations are subject to confirmation not 
merely by the Senate, but by the House of Representatives as 
well."69 With respect to these two commissioners, the only deviation 
from the procedural requirements of the appointments clause was 
the dual confirmation provision. Later in the opinion, the Court 
stated that "the ultimate question is which, if any, of those powers 
may be exercised by the present voting Commissioners, none of 
whom was- appointed as provided by [the appointments] clause."00 
It is apparent, therefore, that the Senate's confirmation authority was 
not viewed as authorizing supplemental confirmation procedures. 
States, 272 U.S. 50, 119 (1926). Additionally, the Court in United States v. 
Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 51 (1851), stated that "the power of appointment is in the Pres-
ident, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and Congress could not by 
law, designate the persons to fill these offices." See 3 OP. ATTY. GEN. 188 (1837). 
Finally, in Buckley itself the Court stated: "The President is given, not the power 
to appoint public officers of the United States, but only the right to nominate them, 
and a provision is inserted by virtue of which Congress may require Senate confir-
mation of his nominees." 424 U.S. at 131 (emphasis original). 
56. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., APPOINTMENTS TO 
THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 387 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as APPOINT• 
MENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES]; E. CORWIN, supra note 43, at 73. 
51. See APPOINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 56, at 400-02; 
E. CoRWIN, supra note 43, at 74. However, some degree of gamesmanship is in-
volved, which sometimes results in a sacrifice of the merits of an appointment. As 
Corwin points out: "If the President in nominating to an office within a state fails 
to consult the preferences of the Senator or Senators of his own party from that state, 
he is very likely to see the appointment defeated on an appeal to the Senate by the 
slighted member or members." Id. at 73. 
58. For the text of the statute, see note 5 supra. 
59. 424 U.S. at 126. 
60. 424 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added to "none of whom was"). 
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Second, with the Court in Buckley refusing to read the excepting 
clause as allowing Congress to vest the appointment power in its own 
officers, 61 Congress is limited to vesting the power in "the President 
alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments."62 Clearly 
Congress' vesting appointment authority in one of the available alter-
natives would not enhance congressional influence. At best, placing 
the authority in the courts would deprive a hostile executive branch 
of substantial appointments power. 63 However, whatever influence 
Congress might gain in depriving the President or his department 
heads of flexibility in choosing inferior officers would be outweighed 
by the loss of the Senate's power to confirm appointees selected 
pursuant to the excepting clause. 
It is apparent, therefore, that article II gives Congress little ability 
to influence significantly the appointment process. If Congress is 
to have a more important role, the authority for that activity must 
be found elsewhere. Thus, the remainder of this section will ex-
plore the extent to which Congress can utilize its necessary and 
proper powers to specify the qualifications an individual must possess 
to hold an office. 64 
61. See notes 44-51 supra and accompanying text. 
62. U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
63. There is evidence that this was Congress' motivation in enacting the FEC ap-
pointment method. See 120 CONG. REC. 7907 (1974) (remarks of Representatives 
Mathis, Hayes, and Thompson). Of course, such narrowing of presidential power 
would be possible only in regard to "inferior officers"-a category that the Supreme 
Court has never clearly defined. -See text at note 43 supra. Looking to the courts, 
however, raises further constitutional problems. First, the text of article II prohibits 
court appointments of superior officers, although the Court's failure to distinguish be-
tween inferior and superior officers makes the reach of this prohibition unclear. See 
note 43 supra. In addition, even though the excepting clause appears to permit 
the court's appointment of any inferior officer, separation of powers considerations 
might limit the court's powers to only those inferior officers exercising significant 
judicial authority. This reading, which restricts congressional freedom further than 
seems to be suggested by article II, finds support in the Court's ruling in Ex parte 
Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). In that case, the Court specifically found 
that the appointment power under the excepting clause "was no doubt intended to 
be exercised by the department of government to which the officer to be appointed 
most appropriately belonged." 38 U.S. at 258. Finally, there are problems in having 
the courts, which ultimately decide the rights and duties of parties affected by legis-
lative enactments, appoint the individuals who will enforce these enactments. This 
joinder of executive and judicial power would appear to be precluded by separation 
of powers considerations. Under article III, the judiciary is limited to the exercise 
of the "judicial power of the United States." Under this same article, this power is 
to "extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. The Court has held 
that Congress cannot vest powers in the courts beyond those falling under this "case 
or controversey" requirement. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
While many of the Court's decisions are concerned with the question whether a 
court itself can exercise a nonjudicial function, there is no apparent reason why the 
prohibition would not extend to indirect influence obtained by appointing others to 
exercise these same functions. 
64. The Court in Buckley expressly foreclosed the use of this power to permit 
direct appointments by Congress. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra. This 
holding imposes an outer limit on the use of this power in the appointment context. 
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The establishment of qualifications for holding federal offices is 
not one of the enumerated powers. 65 It is, however, beyond dispute 
that the creation and management of federal offices is a concern of 
the federal government. The Court has consistently recognized that 
Congress possesses an implied power under the necessary and proper 
clause to create the offices needed to fulfill the purposes of duly en-
acted legislation. 66 In addition, article II specifically gives the fed-
eral government the power to fill these offices. As a practical mat-
ter, criteria that narrow the range of candidates for a government 
office must be formulated if the filling of constitutionally authorized 
positions is not to be done arbitrarily and chaotically, and if pro-
grams enacted by the legislature are to be carried out effectively. 07 
Surely the power to specify qualifications for federal positions rests 
somewhere within the federal government itself. It would, after all, 
be incongruous to assert that the creation of and appointment to fed-
eral offices is a federal concern but that, because the power to 
specify the qualifications of such officers is not expressly delegated 
to the federal government, it is retained by the states. 68 
Therefore, the next question is which branch or branches of the 
federal government should be allowed to exercise this power. It 
would be quite plausible to consider the power to set qualifications 
as a mere adjunct to the executive's article II appointment power. 
Such a proposition is not disproved by the fact that Congress has 
itself enacted many statutes that specify eligibility requirements60 be-
65. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 264-65 (1926), the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Brandeis noted: 
There is not a word in the Constitution which in terms authorizes Congress to 
limit the President's freedom of choice in making nominations for executive 
offices. It is to appointment as distinguished from nomination that the Consti-
tution imposes in terms the requirement of Senatorial consent. 
66. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); Shurtleff v. United States, 
189 U.S. 311, 312 (1903); E. CORWIN, supra note 43, at 70; C. ANTIEAU, supra note 
54, at 517. 
67. See 13 OP. Arn. GEN. 516, 520 (1871). Of course, this applies only to 
offices created by act of Congress. In the case of constitutional offices, the Consti-
tution may be read as specifically establishing the permissible range of fixed qualifica-
tions and leaving some informal discretion to the appointing authority. In this situa-
tion, there would be a strong implication against a power freely to modify or add 
qualifications for a particular office. State court decisions that have so held are col-
lected in Annot., 34 A.LR.2d 155, 168 (1954). This same limitation is evident in 
the federal debate over Congress' right to set substantive qualifications on its own 
membership. See Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
68. If this argument were accepted, then the article II grant would be merely a 
formality. The states would control appointments with only pro forma approval by 
the article II appointment authority. This interpretation of article II was rejected 
implicitly in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 125. See 13 OP. Arn. GEN. 516 (1871); note 
22 supra. 
69. For a collection of some of these statutes, see Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 265-74 nn.35-56 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Perhaps the most no-
table additional statute is the Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105 (1970). As 
Justice Brandeis noted: 
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cause the constitutionality of these statutes has never been tested.70 
Nevertheless, this Note argues that if Congress has the authority 
under the necessary and proper clause to create a federal office for 
the public good, then Congress should also be able, under the same 
clause, to require the appointment of qualified officers by placing 
limitations upon the appointing authority's freedom of choice. The 
rationale for recognizing this power is that it helps Congress ensure 
that the purposes of its enactments are fulfilled. 71 This is precisely 
the rationale used by numerous courts in upholding the power of 
state legislatures to prescribe the qualifications necessary for holding 
state office. 72 
It should not be presumed that the congressional power to specify 
qualifications is unlimited, for it cannot be exercised inconsistently 
[A] multitude of laws have been enacted which limit the President's power to 
make nominations, and which, through the restrictions imposed, may prevent the 
selection of the person deemed by him best fitted. Such restriction upon the 
power to nominate has been exercised by Congress continuously since the foun-
dation of the Government. Every President has approved one or more of such 
acts. 
272 U.S. at 265. 
70. The exercise of the power to set qualifications has never been explicitly sanc-
tioned by the Court. See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 54, at 214. There is dicta, how-
ever, to the effect that Congress is empowered to do so. See Cummings v. Missouri, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 
(1866), the Court distinguished Congress' power to set qualifications for office from 
the power to require an oath for admission to the federal bar: 
The profession of an attorney and counsellor is not like an office created by 
an act of Congress, which depends for its continuance, its powers, and its emolu-
ments upon the will of its creator, and the possession o( which may be burdened 
with any conditions not prohibited by the Constitution. 
71. This is in large part the basis for the Federal Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
1101-1105 (1970). It was passed and later amended to prevent wholesale patronage 
abuse of the federal appointment power. See D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE 
AND THE CoNSTITUTION 77 (1971); Salmon, supra note 54, at 90. 
72. See, e.g., State v. Von Baumbach, 12 Wis. 310, 313 (1860) (non-constitu-
tional offices are "subjected to the discretion of the Legislature which represents the 
sovereign power of the state, and can make such rules as it deems wholesome and 
proper for the maintenance of good government"); Rogers v. City of Buffalo, 123 
N.Y. 173, 25 N.E. 274 (1890); Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 66 Wyo. 143, 206 P.2d 
741 (1949). Other state cases are collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 155, 168 
(1954). 
It might be argued that state cases provide no authority for the federal context 
because state legislatures and Congress derive their powers from different sources. 
State constitutions initially grant plenary power to the legislature and then circum-
scribe that power by specific limitations. See, e.g., State ex rel. Workman v. Gold-
thait, 172 Ind. 210, 220, 87 N.E. 133, 136 (1909). In contrast, the United States 
Constitution delegates specific powers to Congress; in the absence of these grants, 
Congress has no power. C. ANTIEAU, supra note 43, at 187. However, in the state 
cases, the courts must ultimately resort to a separation of powers analysis to resolve 
conflicts between executive appointment power and legislative control over offices. 
While the United States Congress' power over offices derives from the necessary and 
proper clause, and not from an enumerated power, the separation of powers consider-
ations are essentially the same. It is thus useful for federal courts to draw upon state 
cases, where the state appointment process closely parallels the federal, as a model of 
the proper balance among governmental branches. 
642 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:627 
with other constitutional provisions-in particular, with article II. 
This conclusion is not dictated by the holding in Buckley, which cir-
cumscribed the power to specify how the appointment is to be made, 
not the power to place restrictions on whom the President may ap-
point. 73 Nevertheless, the principle upon which the Court based its 
conclusion should not be read narrowly: 
Congress may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
create "offices" in the generic sense and provide such method of ap-
pointment to those "offices" as it chooses. But Congress' power un-
der that Clause is inevitably bounded by the express language of Art. 
II, § 2, cl. 2, and unless the method it provides comports with the 
latter, the holders of those offices will not be "Officers of the United 
States. "74 
This language appears to state that any use of the necessary and 
proper clause-not just an attempt to alter how the appointment is 
made-must comport with article II. 
This language is consistent with the conclusion of United States 
Attorney General Akerman, who recognized in an 1871 opinion that 
the appointments clause may constrain any congressional efforts to 
influence the appointments process:75 
If to appoint is merely to do a formal act, that is to authenticate a 
selection not made by the appointing power, then there is no constitu-
tional objection . . . . But if appointment implies an exercise of 
judgment and will, the officer must be selected according to the judg-
ment and will of the person or body in whom the appointing power 
is vested by the Constitution, and a mode of selection which gives 
no room for the exercise of that judgment and will is inadmissible. 76 
This Note has already demonstrated that exercise of the power of 
appointment is considerably more than "a formal act,"77 for it vests 
73. The Court stated: 
Appellee Commission . . . contend[s) . . . that whatever shortcomings the 
provisions for the appointment of members of the Commission might have under 
Art. II, Congress had ample authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
of Art. I to effectuate this result. We do not agree. The proper inquiry when 
considering the Necessazy and Proper Clause is not the authority of Congress 
to create an office or a commission, which is broad indeed, but rather its au-
thority to provide that its own officers may make appointments to such office 
or commission. 
So framed, the claim that Congress may provide for this manner of appoint-
ment under the Necessazy and Proper Clause of Art. I [is without merit] .... 
424 U.S. at 134-35 (emphasis added). Some draw a distinction between the nomina-
tion and appointment process. See note 65 supra. So viewed, Buckley, which dealt 
with appointment, should not necessarily be applied to the nomination aspect. 
74. 424 U.S. at 138-39. 
75. One commentator has observed that the permissive nature of the civil service 
system was probably a result of Akerman's conclusion that any restriction on the 
"judgment and will" of the President with respect to appointments would be uncon-
stitutional. See Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service 
Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 954 n.59 (1976). 
76. 13 OP. ATIY. GEN. 516, 518 (1871). 
77. See Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290,293 (1900); note 22 supra. 
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in the appointing authority the ability to influence policy in signifi-
cant ways. It appears, therefore, that any authority possessed by 
Congress to prescribe the qualifications necessary to hold an office 
must be restricted by the "necessity of leaving scope for the judg-
ment and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution vests 
the power of appointment."78 
The Akerman opinion, however, expressly declined to define the 
point at which a congressional attempt to influence the appointment 
process so significantly infringes upon the prerogative of the execu-
tive that it is rendered unconstitutional. 79 Indeed, any effort to draw 
such a line encounters considerable difficulty. On the one hand, im-
position by Congress of criteria so specific as to narrow the "choice" 
to one particular individual would constitute indirect exercise of the 
appointment function-a result inconsistent with separation of 
powers. 80 On the other hand, as the Framers acknowledged when 
they provided for the Senate's veto power, the executive does not 
need complete, unfettered discretion. 81 The power to set qualifica-
tions, however, has a far greater potential for curtailing executive 
discretion than individual vetoes of each appointment. 82 Through 
these requirements, Congress can effectively foreclose any consider-
ation of a wide range of individuals. 83 
78. 13 OP. Arn. GEN. 516, 520 (1871). 
19. Id. at 525. 
80. See text at note 98 infra. Indirect usurpation was explicitly condemned 
in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928), and certainly runs afoul 
of the Court's holding in Buckley concerning Congress' inability to appoint. See 424 
U.S. at 13:5. There have, however, been occasions when Congress has seemed to 
usurp power to the point of naming a specific individual. See Note, Power of 
Appointment to Public Office Under the Federal Constitution, 42 HARV. L. REv. 426, 
430 (1929). The Buckley Court provides an explanation for these instances in holding 
that Congress may provide a method of appointment outside of the provisions of 
article II when the officers "perform duties only in aid of those functions that Congress 
may carry out by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and 
enforcement of the public law as to permit them being performed by persons not 
'Officers of the United States.'" 424 U.S. at 139. Such direct congressional appoint-
ments as that of John Trumbull to paint a portrait, 3 Stat. 400 (1817), fit nicely into 
the latter category of the Court's exception. 
This same type of super-qualification could be used to disqualify a particular in-
dividual. However, this would violate the provision against the passage of "bills of 
attainder" found in art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 
(1946). 
81. As explained by the Court in Myers; 
The rejection of a nominee of the President for a particular office does not 
greatly embarrass him in the conscientious discharge of his high duties in the 
selection of those who are to aid him, because the President usually has an ample 
field from which to select for office, according to his preference, competent and 
capable men. 
272 U.S. at 121. 
82. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text. 
83. There is also a significant difference between the Senate's failure to ap-
prove all but the desired candidate and a statute that forecloses all but one "choice." 
In the latter case, the President's failure to appoint the specified individual could sub-
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No federal cases have attempted to delineate the boundary 
between permissible qualification standards and impermissible pre-
emption of the executive's ability to choose his nominees, but several 
state cases have addressed this issue. 84 These courts have generally 
held that state legislatures may prescribe the characteristics an indi-
vidual must possess "so long as the restrictions can be classed as 
qualification[s]"85-that is, if the restrictions are general, are de-
designed to ensure that the appointee possesses the skills or back-
ground necessary to perform adequately the duties of the office, and 
are intended to help the executive make an informed appointment, 
then the restrictions are permissible. 86 
Applying this approach in the federal context87 effectively 
balances the appointment prerogatives of the executive with the 
proper responsibilities of Congress. The necessary and proper 
clause empowers Congress to create offices for certain public 
purposes and to specify the qualifications that individuals must 
possess to hold such offices.88 These qualifications, however, must 
be designed both to further valid legislative goals and to assist the 
executive in making an informed judgment. Congress may not, in 
effect, exercise its necessary and proper powers to usurp the execu-
tive's right under the appointments clause to make the final choice. 80 
The authority to establish general qualifications for holding 
federal office has been used by Congress in a variety of contexts. 
It has, for example, occasionally established qualification require-
ments based on age, experience, educational background, or political 
affiliation. 00 These standards are intended to ensure the compe-
ject him to impeachment for failure to execute the laws, whereas in the former in-
stance he could merely nominate ad infinitum without jeopardy. 
84. For a collection of cases, see Dawley, The Governors' Constitutional Powers 
of Appointment and Removal, 22 MINN. L. REv. 451, 455-56 nn.21-29 (1938). 
85. Dawley, supra note 84, at 455. 
86. See id. at 455-56; Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 155 (1954) (setting qualifications 
for constitutional offices). 
87. See note 72 supra. 
88. Of course, if the legislature were to settle on some impermissible qualification, 
such as race, serious constitutional questions would be raised. Such restrictions have 
been held to violate the due process and privileges and immunities provisions of both 
state and federal constitutions. See Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 155 (1954) (cases col-
lected concerning state legislatures' range of permissible qualifications); Annot., 140 
A.L.R. 471 (1942) (cases dealing with constitutionality of membership in political 
party). 
89. Nevertheless, one commentator has described the authority to set qualifica-
tions as "[b]y far the most important limitation on presidential autonomy in this 
field of power." E. CORWIN, supra note 43, at 74. 
90. There is ample federal statutory precedent for these types of restrictions, 
See id.; note 69 supra. Of particular interest is the regulatory agency area where 
the political affiliation criterion is frequently used to achieve a nonpartisan member-
ship. See Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970); Federal Communica-
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tence of the appointee or the political neutrality of the particular 
agency91-objectives that are consistent with the broader goals 
embodied in the necessary and proper clause and, thus, are not of-
fensive to the appointments clause. 
Congress has also used the technique of restricting the executive's 
choice to a list of eligible persons compiled either by Congress 
itself or by officials appointed by Congress. 92 The task of delineating 
a boundary between permissible qualification standards and imper-
missible preemption of the executive's appointment power is especially 
difficult in this case. 93 The most important example of the use of 
the list is the federal civil service system. 94 This scheme utilizes an 
examination that evaluates the aptitude of the candidates. 95 The 
Civil Service Commission then certifies a certain number of the top 
performers to the appointing authority as candidates eligible for 
selection. 96 
The Supreme Court has never considered whether these "list pro-
visions" of the Federal Civil Service Act comport with the appoint-
ments clause.97 However, the constitutionality of the list concept was 
discussed by Att0mey General Akerman in his 1871 opinion. He 
first considered whether Congress could require the President to ap-
point to a vacant office the individual who had the best score on the 
civil service examination and concluded that such a requirement sub-
stituted the judgment of Congress for that of the President, thereby 
violating the appointments clause. 98 He then considered whether 
Congress could require the executive to choose its nominee from a 
list of candidates who possessed certain qualifications, such as a 
minimum score on the examination, and decided as follows: 
Congress could require that officers shall be of American citizenship 
or of a certain age, that judges should be of the legal profession and 
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78(d) (1970). 
91. Whether this actually works is a question of some controversy. See APPOINT-
MENTS TO TilE REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 56, at 386, 402. 
92. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 274 n.56 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
93. See notes 76-83 supra and accompanying text. 
94. 5 u.s.c. § 1101-1105 (1970). 
95. 5 u.s.c. § 3304-3313 (1970). 
96. See 5 U.S.C. § 3317 (1970) (amended 1972 and 1974). 
97. However, there is dictum to the effect that it is constitutional. See In re 
Miller, 5 Mackey 507 (D.C. 1887), error dismissed, 140 U.S. 690 (1891). Various 
specific provisions of the Act have been attacked and directly passed on by the Court. 
See Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down provisions making aliens 
ineligible for civil service posts); Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948) (upholding 
preference of veterans over nonveterans in retention decisions during layoffs); 
Gianatasio v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 531, 178 N.E. 782 (1931), appeal dismissed, 284 
U.S. 595 (1932) (veteran's preference challenge dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question). 
98. 13 Op. ATTY. GEN. 516, 523 (1871). 
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of a certain standing in the profession, and still leave room to the 
appointing power for the exercise of its own judgment and will; and 
I am not prepared to affirm that to go further, and require that the 
selection shall be made from persons found by an examining board 
to be qualified in such particulars as diligence, scholarship, integrity, 
good manners, and attachment to the Government, would impose an 
unconstitutional limitation on the appointing power . . . . 00 
Although the Attorney General conceded the difficulty of determin-
ing precisely how much discretion must be left to the executive under 
the appointments clause, he concluded that a selection procedure 
similar to the certified list would not necessarily violate the require-
ments of the clause if the list had more than one candidate.100 
This opinion, of course, does not conclusively demonstrate the 
constitutional validity of the certified list. It is useful, therefore, to 
consider the manner by which states with similar civil service sys-
tems have dealt with this issue.101 Direct support for the legislative 
use of the certified list can be found in the state civil service cases.102 
These holdings are grounded in the belief that the civil service tests 
objectively assist the executive in ascertaining who is best prepared 
to implement legislative programs and do not eliminate executive 
discretion.103 They have recognized that the legislature has a legiti-
mate interest in having properly qualified officials administering the 
programs it enacts and that the executive has no valid interest in ap-
pointing incompetent officers. 
Although state courts have generally upheld the certified list 
appointment procedure in the state civil service cases, they have 
not been as sympathetic to the procedure in cases challenging the 
method of appointment for directors of state regulatory agencies.104 
Such results are not surprising. The primary reason for the disparate 
treatment is that, unlike civil service appointees, directors of regula-
tory agencies are explicitly vested with considerable discretion to for-
mulate enforcement policy.105 The decision of who will perform 
99. Id. at 524-25. 
100. "[T]he difficulty of drawing a line between such limitations as are, and such 
as are not, allowed by the Constitution, is no proof that both classes do not exist." 
Id. at 525. 
101. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw §§ 50, 60-61 (McKinney 1973); Wis. 
STAT, ANN, §§ 16.11-16.12, 16.20 (1972). 
102. See, e.g., In re O'Connor, 181 N.Y.S.2d 456, 470 (1958); Ricks v. Depart-
ment of State Civil Serv., 200 La. 341, 8 So. 2d 49 (1942); State ex rel. Buell v. 
Frear, 146 Wis, 291, 131 N.W. 832 (1911). 
103. The tests [on which the list is to be based] are to be practical in their nature 
and appropriate to ascertain the fitness and skill of the applicant and impose 
no unreasonable conditions or restrictions on the appointing officer in the exer-
cise of his power, and clearly serve to aid him in selecting competent servants. 
State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 303, 131 N.W. 832, 835 (1911). 
104. See, e.g., Westlake v. Merrit, 95 So. 662 ( 1923); State ex rel. Childs v. 
Griffin, 69 Minn. 311, 72 N.W. 117 (1897). 
105. Regulatory agency enabling acts frequently provide for enforcement discre-
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regulatory functions is, therefore, based primarily on the executive's 
subjective evaluation of the candidate's policy orientation. On the 
other hand, the decision as to who can best perform the civil service 
function need in general involve only a minimum of subjective con-
siderations, since more or less quantitatively measurable aptitude, 
rather than a particular policy orientation, is most important.106 That 
the use of the certified list in the regulatory agency context has been 
resisted is thus not surprising; such a procedure might unjustifiably 
infringe upon the executive's enforcement policy-making discre-
tion.107 
The distinction has equal validity in the federal context. With 
respect to officers who have no authority to make national policy, 
Congress, through the civil service framework, should be able to re-
quire the President to choose from a list of those individuals who 
have excelled on an objective examination. Such a procedure, how-
ever, would not be appropriate for selection of directors of regulatory 
agencies. Although Congress may require appointees to possess cer-
tain general qualifications regarding age, experience, or political af-
filiation deemed necessary for managing a regulatory agency or for 
ensuring nonpartisanship, it may not require -the executive to choose 
from a list of candidates that presumably will adhere to the enforce-
ment policies Congress considers most desirable. The subjective 
decisions inherent in regulatory agency administration require under 
separation of powers principles that the President be allowed to 
choose officers for these agencies, subject only to broad, general qual-
ification restrictions and the Senate's article II conf~ation power.108 
In short, the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to 
specify certain qualifications that must be met by officeholders. 
However, this power is limited by the same constitutional principles 
tion to be placed in an associated commission. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46 (1970); Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-437g 
(Supp. V 1975). Both the federal and state civil service statutes recognize exemp-
tions for these types of officers. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(l)(B) (1970) (ex-
cepting from civil service those officers appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate); N.Y. C1v. SERv. LAW § 35 (McKinney 1973). Some 
states provide for a special "exempt" class, which includes positions that by either the 
nature of their duties or relation to the appointing officer are of a confidential nature 
and therefore not amenable to objective testing for fitness. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. 
LAW § 41 (McKinney 1973 ). But see D. RosENBLOOM, supra note 71, at 12-13 
(pointing out the large amount of "unofficial" enforcement discretion lodged in civil 
service functionaries). 
106. The elimination of suspect discretion in the appointing authority was the 
basis for the replacement of the spoils system with the merit system. See note 71 
supra. 
107. Of course, it is not legitimate, even in the civil service setting, for the legis-
lature to usurp the executive's appointment discretion by requiring certification of a 
"list" of one. See notes 76-80 supra. 
108. See note 52 supra. 
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articulated in article Il that prohibit congressional appointments. 
Thus, Congress may not attempt to influence the process by which 
government officers are selected if the effect of such involvement 
is to impair the executive's appointment power. 
